

September 4

1. Ambassador's car stopped several blocks from Residence by four armed men at approximately 1445 on September 4.
2. Ambassador's chauffeur called DCM Belton with the news at approximately 1500.
3. DCM sent FLASH cable to Washington at 1505 and placed call to Brazil Desk which came through at 1420 our time. All available information received from chauffeur transmitted to Federal Police and all other intelligence units in both federal and state governments. All Brazilian authorities notified.
4. Foreign Minister went to President's palace to confer with military ministers and presidential staff.
5. Foreign Minister called on DCM at Embassy and expressed regrets and concern. DCM gave him copy of kidnappers' note and FonMin returned with it to Presidential Palace.
6. DCM calls on General Franca, Secretary of Public Security for State of Guanabara.
7. DCM calls on FonMin to express concern that no overall coordination of police action and search operations existent, and urged that coordinator be appointed. FonMin's advisers took notes and transmitted instructions by telephone. Re kidnappers' demands, FonMin asked for USG views. DCM expressed personal opinion GOB could not gamble with life of Ambassador.
8. DCM returned to Embassy, found U.S. position in telegram and phoned FonMin. Message being we hoped GOB would take all necessary measures including release of prisoners if that appeared necessary.
9. Early evening, FonOff issues official statement to press giving out news of kidnapping, expressing regret and revulsion over this terrorist act.
10. Papal Nuncio calls on DCM to express concern. DCM showed him copy of ransom note, and after reading it Nuncio called on FonMin to urge GOB to accede to kidnappers' demands.
11. Military Ministers, Min Justice, FonMin and others meet to discuss situation.

SEPTEMBER 5

1. UPI informs Embassy that both Chilean and Mexican Ambassadors have volunteered their countries as places of asylum for 15 prisoners.
2. At noon Nuncio called meeting of representatives of 14 Embassies, chiefly LA and European, to issue joint statement appealing to kidnappers to release Ambassador and offering services Diplomatic Corps as contact (latter part not agreed upon).
3. FonMin announced to press in early afternoon that GOB would release prisoners as demanded. FonMin notified DCM of release this announcement.
4. Second handwritten note from Ambassador picked up by Jornal do Brasil about 1545 acknowledging news of GOB announcement. Names of 15 prisoners accompanied letter which mentioned Mexico as place prisoners would go.
5. DCM called on FonMin to see what next GOB move would be. Discovered Fonoff had not made arrangements with other countries to receive prisoners. FonMin seized on suggestion of Mexico in note and said would make arrangements with GOM immediately. Asked U.S. good offices in convincing GOM it should cooperate.
6. DCM called Mexican Charge upon returning to Embassy and told him Fonoff would be making approach. DCM also suggested via telegram that U.S. Embassy Mexico discuss matter with GOM.
7. Mexican Charge called DCM to say he had GOM authorization, that he had been approached by Brazilians and that he understood prisoners would be moved out on Brazilian military plane.
8. Papal Nuncio called on DCM to show note Nuncio had sent to FonMin and which FonMin would read at 10 p.m. on nationwide T.V. broadcast. This part of FonMin campaign to make GOB decision as acceptable as possible to all groups in Brazil.
9. Nuncio also showed DCM copy of secret document he had drafted together with FonMin to be used by FonMin in his efforts convince military ministers they should recede to requests of kidnappers.

10. Nuncio also provided Embassy with copy of statement he prepared make in own name as appeal to kidnappers to release Ambassador.
11. Fonoff confirms radio bulletin that FonMin's TV-Radio Broadcast scheduled for 10 p.m. officially postponed to next day. No explanation given.
12. At 2200 hours, Embassy cabled information that it understood active steps under way round up 15 prisoners for transport to Mexico. Prisoners located in Rio, Sao Paulo, Recife.

September 6

1.

GOB leaders

may have decided reopen question of prisoner release under pressure from military. Embassy cable said would continue exert all possible influence prevent any slippage from original GOB position.

2. Chilean Ambassador called Embassy to confirm Chile would accept 15 prisoners (he had already notified FonOff and Papal Nunci<sup>o</sup>).

3. DCM talked with Gen. Muricy, coordinator of GOB efforts in this case, who said Chile probably not acceptable to GOB because of its proximity.

4. Word received that Military Ministers made decision in A.M. meeting to send prisoners out of country and that action being taken to dispatch them immediately.

FOIA(b)(1)

September 7

1. Prisoners in transit to Mexico
2. Prisoners arrived Mexico about 5 p.m.
3. Elbrick released 8:00 p.m.

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